JUDICIAL POWERS OF INTERPRETATION
UNDER FOREIGN CODES.
The Swiss Civil Code,1 the. most modern of European
codes, contains in Article One of its . "Introductory Title" an
unusual provision evidencing a changed attitude towards a political dogma of the nineteenth century, the separation of the
legislative and judicial functions. It reads:
"Art. i. The written law governs all matters to which either
the letter or spirit of any of its provisions refer. In the absence
of a provision of such law applicable to a case, the judge shall decide
according to customary law and, in the absence of custom, according
to the rule which he would establish were he acting as legislator.
"He shall base his decisions upon the solutions adopted by
text-writers and in judicial decisions." 2
This is the most radical statement of its kind in any foreign
code known to the writer. It is proposed here to examine a
few of the leading codes of Europe and South America, to
trace, if possible, the direction which the development of this
subject is taking.
Before examining the codes it may be well to state the
problem which interpretation presents to the civilian jurist and
which different codes have regulated in different ways.
Codification presents the danger of arresting legal progress.
We are all ready to admit that law, as a manifestation of society,
is like a flowing stream, that struggles to keep abreast of social
development. When law is crystallized into the unvarying text
of a code, the flow of its expression is checked, though social
progress continues its course. Upon interpretation or upon
periodic revision must depend the maintenance of harmony between the injunctions of the code and the practice of every-day
life. Now, periodic revision of the codes has not been the
Adopted December LI, i9o7 (in effect January 1, 1912).
'The Swiss Civil Code has been translated by Robert P. Shick for the
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practice of any of the countries it is proposed to study here.2
Of course subsequent legislation has renovated parts or added
rules to govern new institutions. But upon interpretation has
chiefly fallen the task of maintaining parallelism between the
codes and social requirements.
Where a code enjoys, substantially unaltered, a life long
enough to span more or less profound changes in social and
economic ideals, there grows up necessarily a body of extra-legislative rules, supplementing the code, often in contradiction to
its precepts, 'and representing the forward movement of society
since the adoption of the code. As the code grows more antiquated, interpretation becomes bolder, until -parts of the code
become a dead letter. The praetorian law of Rome gradually
-,pplemented and corrected the jus civile of the old type; in the
Anglo-American system we have a dual system of common law
and equity, equity being a correction of a system which changed
and still changes too slowly; while the last century has given
rise, in the countries of codification, to a system of authority
parallel to the codes, interpretative of and complementary to
them, and of increasing importance. This body of authority is
composed of decisions of the court, or, in continental terminology, "jurisprudence." 4
L
In France, before the Revolution, the courts, known as
Parliaments, used to issue regulative decrees, 5 subject to royal
approval, which served not only as decisions in the specific instances but also remedied deficiencies of the law in future application. The Parliaments were exercising a legislative function.
The Revolution, with its new philosophy of the State, changea
' The Spanish Civil Code in Art. i of its "Additional Provisions" provides machinery for perodic revision. Each year the Supreme Court should
transmit to the Minister of Justice a report upon the defects and insuo
ciencies noted in the law and the Minister of Justice should transmit the same
to the permanent codification commission. This machinery has never been
used. The Chilean Civil Code, Art. 5, provides that the Supreme Court shall
make a similar report to the President of the Republic. This has never
been followed out.
"Lambert: "La Fonction du Droit Civil Compare" (Paris, z9o3), pM.
173-20&
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all that. Judges and legislators had, henceforth, to keep strictly
within the sphere of their proper powers.
The French Civil Code, enacted in 1804, with its history
of more than a century, spans the industrial revolution and many
important social reforms. It has been altered and expanded,
while a great mass of interpretation has accumulated about it.
The Code contains two Articles bearing directly on the
question of application and interpretation.
"Art. 4. The judge who refuses to render judgment, under
pretext of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law, may be
prosecuted as guilty of denial of justice.
"Art. 5. Judges may not, in the cases brought before them,
render judgment in the form of general or regulative decrees."
Silence or defect of the law does not excuse the judge from
pronouncing a decision. If he finds no solution in the Code or
statutes, he seeks enlightenment in analogy, the general spirit
of the law, custom, judicial decisions, the literature of .the law,
known as "doctrine,' and his own natural sense of equity. The
codifiers realized that no code could presume to regulate in
anticipation every possible combination of facts. But they also
realized that justice must be dispensed by the courts and only
by the courts. The legislature could not be called upon to express its will in isolated judicial contests, nor could the opinions
of the judges be given effect beyond the specific set of facts
which called them forth, for each of these alternatives, it was
believed, would confuse political functions.
Thus, there has gradually accumulated about the Code a
mass of decisions both interpretative and creative. To the common law lawyer, it does not seem stretching the principle of
res judicata to regard a single decision as binding courts upon
similar sets of fact. Sir Frederick Pollock pointed out that to
do so is merely applying to case-law the scientific principle that
uniform consequences flow from uniform facts6 It is thus
made possible, in a system of judge-made law, to predict the
"'Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics" (London, 1882), Chap. 9.
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decision of the court upon a given set of facts. But it is very
evident from Article Five of the Civil Code that the French
jurist regards such a respect for the single case as an unlawful
extension of judicial power. For a court, by its opinion in the
case of A. v. B., to bind for future time all other courts upon
a similar state of facts, would be to "render judgment in the
form of general or regulative decrees."
There is one exception in the French system, whereby a
decision of a higher court is made binding upon a lower court.
The Shpreme Court of France may not render final judgment
upon the facts of a case, but only declare wherein a lower tribunal has erred. Cases which go up to the Supreme Court do
not receive final judgment there except when affirmed. If the
court below is found to have erred, the case is sent back for rejudgment by another lower court. As illusfrating how contrary
to the feeling of the French'jurist was the idea of binding one
court by proceedings before another, we find that after a lower
court has been declared in error and the case has been remanded
to other judges, these are still free, at least once, to disagree
with the Supreme Court. The case then goes to the Supreme
Court a second time, where it is studied in plenary session. If
the lower court is again convicted of error, the case is returned
and this time, the lower court must abide by the conclusions of
law of its superior. However, it is bound only in the specific
case. No other court is bound, and the same court may .n
theory return to its original opinion in a new case presenting
the same facts.'
What value, then, has "jurisprudence" under such a system? It is not law in the sense that it has any sanctioned
authority. Its sole authority is that of reason. In the AngloAmerican system a single decision of a higher court establishes
a binding precedent upon lower courts. In France each court
has its own "jurisprudence," that is to say, a line of its own
decisions, which by their continuity establishes its doctrines upon
a given point. It is usual to speak of the "jurisprudence" of
'Law April x,1837. Cf. Faye, "Cour du Cassation" (Paris, I9o3), pp.
312-319.
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the "Cour de Cassation," of the "Cour d'Appel," or of the
"Tribunal d'Aix." There is a great likelihood, because of the
natural conservatism and dignity of courts, that a rule that has
grown up through a current of decisions, will persist, that is
to say, be followed by the particular court in future cases. Of
course the "jurisprudence" of the Supreme Court has greater
weight than that of the lower courts. And yet, until an extralegislative doctrine has been adhered to for a period by all
courts, it cannot be said to be established as a predictable ruling
over the whole country. We might say that, after a period of
time, out of the unhampered conflict between courts, there
gradually distills certain more or less well defined streams of
judicial doctrine. These are to be obtained from the collections
of French "jurisprudence." While they have not the weight
of decisions under the common law.system, they have such importance that they must be consulted in connection with the
Code in every case.
Along side of "jurisprudence" as a source of interpretation is "doctrine," a term regularly used correlatively witir
"jurisprudence" and meaning the theories developed by textwriters. In France "doctrine" haod a greater historical importance than "jurisprudence." But this is no longer true. After
the adoption of the Civil Code, authors devoted their efforts to
interpretations of the texts of the Code, not in the light of
changing social requirements but of a rigorous logic. The consequence was that the great commentaries of the Civil Code were
not so much critical legal studies as repositories of toryism.
The time came when the courts were forced to break away from
this early spirit of interpretation and to commence the more
constructive period of interpretation through "jurisprudence,"
which is in the flush of its success today.8
IL
Let us now examine the law of some countries where
French influence has been great.
The Italian Civil Code (i865) declares: 9

$Cf. Lambert, "Fonction du Droit
'Art. 3, Sec.

2.

Civil Compar," pp. i5-2.
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"Whenever a question cannot be settled by specific statutory
rules, regard shall be had to provisions regulating analogous cases
or analogous subjects; when the question still remains in doubt, a
decision shall be rendered according to the general principles of the
law."

The Civil Code of ,Procedure '0 subjects the judge who re-

fuses to decide a case, properly brought before him, to a civil
penalty.
The "general principles" of the law are the juridical spirit
of the code, together with "jurisprudence" and "doctrine" as we

have described them. In Italy the decided case enjoys no greater
authority than in France."

Non exemplis, sed legibus iudi-

candum.
In the Spanish Civil Code (1889)

12

is an echo of the prin-

ciples just stated.
"The court refusing to render judgment under pretext of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law renders itself liable
thereby.
"When there is no law precisely applicable to the point in
controversy, the custom of the place shall be applied, and in the
absence of a custom the general principles of the law."'s

In Spain the only "jurisprudence" of importance is that of
the Supreme Court and the opinions of this court are the only
ones that receive faithful publication.
"Art. 782, See. 2.
" "Instituzioni di Diritto Civile Italiano," Emanuele Gianturco (7th Ed.
x9o5, Florence), p. 19.
"Art 6.
" 8The very early law Qf Spain was not like Art. 6 of the present Code,
as shown by the aucient Siete Partidas, Part 7, Title 22, Law xr, ".
.
when judges are in doubt in what manner they shall give their judgmets in
view of the evidence and of the rights which both the parties prove before
them, they shall make inquiry of wise men of those plices where they are
sitting in judgment, who shall be free of all suspicion, and shall make plain
to them all the facts as it was done before them. And if by the response of
these wise men the judges are able to dissipate the doubt in which they stood,
they shall render judgment in the manner which we have- already shown.
But if certain of them cannot dissipate that doubt, they shall have all the
proceedings drawn up in writing, just as it transpired before them, well and
truthfully, and afterwards have it read to the parties in order that these may
sed and understand whether all has been written that was argued. And if
the judges find that anything has becen added, omitted or changed, they shall
rectify it, and afterwards seal the writing with their seals and givi to each
one of the parties his own written record and they shall bear them to the
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IIL
In the Spanish-American Republics, Spanish and French
influence has been strong. It is remarkable how closely these
new-world countries, less bound by tradition and the civilian
point of view, have followed the continental doctrine.
The Chilean Civil Code of 1885 is a very complete code
and a remarkable piece of legislation. Let us examine two
Articles from its "Introductory Title":
"Art. 3. To the legislator alone it falls to explain or interpret
the law in a manner universally obligatory."
This is, we may say, the other side of the doctrine of the
French Code, which declares that "judges may not render judgment in the form of general or regulative decrees." This should
have seemed adequate to fix the status of "jurisprudence," but
the Chilean codifier continued in the same Article:
"Judicial decisions have no binding force save in the causes in
which they are actually .pronounced."
Later,. having laid down certain principles to govern interpretation, the Code continues:*
"Art. 24. In cases in which the preceding rules of interpretation cannot be applied, obscure or contradictory passages (of the
law) shall be interpreted in the manner most conformable to the
general spirit of legislative law and natural equity."
In the Argentine Republic the Civil Code (1869) laid down
the same strict rule of interpretation.
"Art. i6. If a question of civil law cannot be decided either by
the words themselves or by the spirit of the law, respect shall be
king. And after all this the judges shall inscribe a letter and send it to the
king, explaining the whole matter and the doubt in which they stood. And
thereupon the king, having the truth, may give judgment, or, if he so desires,
send instruction to those judges as to how they shall render it. But no
judge may do this to excuse-himself from work, or by reason of the length
of the case, or for the fear, or love, or hate he may bear any of the parties;
but only because he does not know how to choose the right, which he would
like to, and ought to; for if he do otherwise, he shall, for that reason,'
receive punishment in the measure that the king holds him deserving of it!
The Siefe Partidaswere one of the most famous codes of the Middle Ages,
compiled in the middle of the thirteenth century by Alfonso X and deriving
its name from the fact that it was divided into "seven parts."
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had for the principles of analogous laws; and if the matter is then
doubtful, the general principles of law shall be applied, with due
consideration for the circumstances of the particular case."
An eminent Argentine commentator 14 notes with regard
to this article:
"'The mistake is .very generally made of believing that one or
several harmonious decisions of the courts constitute 'jurisprudence.' This error has led our courts to aim to deprive judges
of their free power to interpret the'law and apply it.To seek
harmony and uniformity of decisions is to paralyze the evolution
of law. There is no doubt but that the decisions of the courts of a
nation deserve great respect; but they should not be considered as
a higher rule hampering the judge and to be imposed upon other
courts. It falls properly within the judge's sphere of liberty to
interpret a law, and we should determine the weight to be given his
interpretation by the uniformity observed in the manner of accepting it. Consequently the 'jurisprudence' of the courts, to possess
force, requires the elements of timei of submission to a changing
judiciary, of similarity of facts, and of frequency of application.
"The courts, high as they may be, may not bind the future, and
assume to settle by their decisions the rules according to which
succeeding cases are to be adjusted. That would be a presumption
of infallibility. Thus, we regard the decisions of the court as
elements of interpretation to be applied with the greatest prudence,
and only when there is uniformity over a more or less long space
of time, permitting a change of judiciary. They should be considered as an element of interpretation similar to 'doctrine."

Iv.
A Civil Code for the entire Empire came into force in
Germany in i9oo. It had been in preparation twenty-six years
and it is not surprising that the painstaking spirit of this nation
produced a work recognized today as the most scientific codification of civil law.
This Code intentionally omitted all reference to the method
of its interpretation. We find, in the form finally adopted by
the legislature, no "introductory title" concerning the application
and interpretation of laws, a part generally met in other
"Machado: "Exposici6n y Comentario del C6digo Civil Argentino"
luenos Aires, x898), VoL i, p. So, note.
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cotles. \Vhy was it that so important a question as that of
ititerpretatiOn, which must necessarily affect the course of future
legal development. should be left open to discussion?

The First Commission prepared a "project" or draft, the
first Article of which commanded that the Code be interpreted
by principles of analogy. Legal relations left unregulated by the
Code were to be governed by rules to be gathered from analogous institutio'is of the Code; and if these were wanting,
the principles underlying the spirit of the law as a whole were
to be applied. In other words the Code was to be its own and
sole source of interpretation. There was to be no recourse to
a common law anterior to codification (Pandektcnrecht), or to
Roman law or to "natural law." While requiring the judge to
act even where the Code was silent, it took from him the freer
exercise of conscience and intellect which we found characterized the French and other systems.
This provision disappeared in the second draft. The -Second Commission realized the narrowness of the restriction. But
no other was substituted.
What are, then, the sources of interpretation? The omission of the first Article from the first "project" was due to
unwillingness to inject into the Code a controverted principle
regarding the use of analogy in interpretation. There was
doubt whether it could be called analogy at all to apply to legal
relations originating after the Code, principles created for other
institutions included within the Code; or whether for the judge
to regulate such new institutions could be held to be interpretation at all.
In suppressing the Article the Second Commission registered its unwillingness to impose any positive regulation upon
interpretation. It did not expressly adopt the view that principles regulating older institutions could be extended by analogy
to regulate new and different ones; nor did it sanction the use
of outside sources. But, at least, the failure of the Commission affirmatively to admit that the judge may draw from outside sources was as significant on the one hand as its suppression
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of the narrower regulation of interpretation by analogy on the
other. The question of interpretation has been left open to
15
debate

V.
We should now be in a better position to appreciate the
changed attitude of the Swiss legislator toward interpretation.
We cannot do better than to turn to the "Exposi des motifs" of
Dr. Eugen Hilber, drafter of the Swiss Code, to learn the legislative intent of Article One. He says: 16
"A body of codified law is complete only in the sense that it may
extend to the whole body of written law, but not in the sense
that it should exclude every other source of law. When ii is
claimed, on the authority of antiquated theories, that codification
creates a complete system of law and embraces, within its letter and
spirit, the provisions necessary for all-cases, codification is confused
with law in general. In our opinion law is one and entire; no
judge may refuse to render a decision under pretext that the law is
wanting. Nevertheless codification may very well present omissions; indeed, it ordinarily evidences numerous such. And how
may we not then recognize that alongside of the codified law there
may, and indeed must, exist other sources of law destined at need to
supplement codified law?
"The written law should certainly be applied first. And it
should be applied not only so far as its text permits, but also so far
as any interpretation can stretch its spirit. Such is the sense of the
first paragraph of Article One. But when written law is lacking, it
is not possible, under the legislative sovereignty of the State, that
is to say, under the written law, to deny recognition to a source of
law which is being effectively observed. When legislation has not in
fact excluded such law by the establishment of specific rules, it would
be inconsistent with itself to deny all value to it. It could not, indeed, so regard it, unless it replaced such law, which was in fact
observed, by statutory law.
"To give expression to this, which is required by the very
nature of things, the Code declares that in the absence of a text
applicable to the case, the judge shall pronounce according to the
customary law (Art. i, paragraph 2)

...

' Cf. Salleilles, "Introduction i l'Etude du droit Civil Allemand" (Paris,
1904). pp. 88-104.
"Expose des motifs de l'avant projet" (Berne, igot), p. 30.
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"tAnother case may present itself. There may be no customary
law to fill the gap in the written law. Where then will the judge
find the norm according to which he may render his decision? His
own consciousness of what is legal must direct him. Nevertheless,
it is not proper that he should form his convictions arbitrarily. He
is obliged to enlighten his conscience by a serious method worthy
of the nature of his functions. In the first place he nmust seek what,
under like facts, others have held or said. In this examination he
shall proceed 'vith all the care which is demanded of him by his
office, lie shall have regard to 'doctrine' and 'jurisprudence,' as is
provided in paragraph Two of Article One. But if he finds there
no indications he can follow out his own convictions, and the
cnly direction which the law can then furnish him is that-he should
not decide arbitrarily, under the influence of accidental circumstances, such as pity. indignation or personal hatred, but as though,
as legislator, he were pronouncing a rule to be applied afterwards
him. This is the sense of the last
to the facts actfially before
7
paragraph of Article One.1
"It has the same meaning as the maxim of legal writers: 'In
such cases the judge shall pronounce as would the iise lawmaker,
had he anticipated the case.'
We may feel certain that Article One of the Swiss Code
does not intend, by the use of the term "legislator," that the court
shall have the power to render judgment in the form of "general or regulative decrees" universally applicable to future states
of fact, such as was denied by Article Five of the French Civil
Code. Nor does the reference to "doctrine" and "jurisprudence" in the last paragraph mean that the English system of
case-law has been introduced into Switzerland. And yet it does
indicate a marked change in the conception of the judicial function before an omission of the law.
The French Code, just a century old when the Swiss draft
was submitted to the Federal Assembly, 8 had aimed to sever
the judicial from the legislative function while obligating the
judge to act even in the silence of the law. The commentators,
embued with the philosophy of the Revolution, strove to make
' In the preliminary draft the arrangement of Article One was different.
Paragraph two requircd that in the absence of a customary rule, the judge
should decide according to "doctrine" and "jurisprudence," while the last
paragraph stated that in the absence of these sources he should act as
legislator.

"'May

28,
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the Code its own interpreter, using analogy and logic as their
tools. To recognize authority in former judicial opinions was
contrary to the spirit and even the words of Article Five.
Consequently expressions of writers enjoyed a higher vogue
than the opinions of judges; and such continued to be the case
until the courts, realizing the growing abyss between written
and practised law, broke away from "doctrine" and commenced
the modern evolution of French law, found largely in "jurisprudence." Of course "doctrine" was discredited and the authority of the courts rose in proportion.
We have seen how the other Latin codes followed in the
path of the French Code, even in the young Latin-American
countries. In Germany the question has been left for the courts
and writers to determine. And yet, we may judge from the
particularistic, as opposed to the doctrinal, spirit of this Code;
from the refusal of the Commission to recognize specifically any
source of interpretation outside the Code itself; from the experience of France in the years following the adoption of her
Code; we may, I think, safely conclude that, for a period at
least, the history of interpretation in Germany will be different
from that in Switzerland.
If the Swiss judge is frankly directed to draw from sources
outside the Code when the Code and customs are silent; and
if he is directed to seek enlightenment from the body of judicial
decisions, is it possible that there shall not grow up, parallel to
the Code, a body of sanctioned law, consisting of judicial custom, similar indeed, within its own sphere, to Anglo-American
judge-made law, with the reservation that respect shall be paid
to a current of authority rather than to the.single decision?
Layton B. Register.
Law School, University of Pennsylvania.

